

Best-Available Copy

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (1 Jun 70)

FOR OT UT 701190

9 June 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th
Infantry Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970 (U)


AD509537

SEE DISTRIBUTION

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION RELATING TO THE
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE BY THIS STATEMENT
ITS RELEASE IS UNLAWFUL
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Information of actions initiated as a result of subject report should be forwarded to ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.


BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:


ROBERT E. LYNCH
 Colonel, AGC
 Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

- Commanding Generals
 - US Continental Army Command
 - US Army Combat Developments Command
 - US Army Materiel Command
- Commandants
 - US Army War College
 - US Army Command and General Staff College
 - US Army Air Defense School
 - US Army Armor School
 - US Army Aviation School
 - US Army Combat Surveillance School
 - US Army Electronic Warfare School
 - US Army Engineer School
 - US Army Field Artillery School
 - US Army Infantry School
 - US Army Institute for Military Assistance
 - US Army Missile and Munitions School



Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.

AD509537

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

2005 0315101

UNCLASSIFIED,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

Commandants

US Army Ordnance School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
OSD(SA) Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Commanding General, III Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Director, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group
Defense Documentation Center
USAF Project RAND
Commanding Officers
US Army Limited War Laboratory
US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
US Army Mobility Equipment Research & Development Center
4th Infantry Division Artillery

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARTILLERY
APO San Francisco 96262

AVDDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Operations: Significant Activities

a. General.

(1) During the period the 4th Infantry Division Artillery fired in support of maneuver forces participating in Operation Hines and Operation Washington Green. The operations ran concurrently and were still in effect at the close of the reporting period.

(2) Task Organization is as shown at Inclosure 1.

(3) Commanders and Principal Staff are shown at Inclosure 2.

(a) Primary Mission: The primary mission of the 4th Infantry Division Artillery was to provide continuous and timely fire support to the 4th Infantry Division and other friendly forces by destroying or neutralizing, in priority, those targets that jeopardized the accomplishment of the mission.

(b) Secondary Mission: To increase the effectiveness of RVNAF artillery elements and enhance the security of civilian population in the area of operation. This was accomplished by instructing RVNAF artillery units in proper firing battery, FDC, and grid clearance procedures, as well as instructing RF/PF, CIDG, PSDF, and village members in the correct procedures for the adjustment of artillery fire.

b. Intelligence. Intelligence was developed in relation to the three Brigade areas of operation, and the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) around Camp Enari. Each will be discussed separately.

(1) Areas of Operation.

(a) 1st Bde area of operations (6-29th Arty DS)

FOR OT UT
701190
Inclosure

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
EOD 08R 5200.10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AVDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 18th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 MCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

1 Enemy Action Binh Dinh. In the area of An Khe, enemy activity was limited to harassment and interdiction of supply routes and occasional standoff attacks with mortar and B-40 fire. Few significant contacts were made with the enemy. A sapper attack on Camp Maccliff on 15 November resulted in the destruction of 19 helicopters. Additionally 122mm rockets were employed by the enemy in the area for the first time. Numerous contacts to the northeast of An Khe during the last part of January indicated a large force operating in that vicinity, tentatively identified as elements of the 18th NVA Regiment. The most significant activity during the period was a ground attack on the AF/PF outpost at Vinh Thanh (FSB Hardtimes). Other enemy units identified in the area were the 2d VC Regiment, and the 407th Sapper Battalion. Terrain in the An Khe area aided the enemy. Dense vegetation, jungle canopy and rugged terrain provided concealment from observation and provided areas in which the enemy could hide or ambush friendly elements. The rugged terrain and canopy also limited movement of friendly elements and hampered both ground movement and aerial resupply.

Weather in Binh Dinh Province was characterized by rain and cool temperatures. Accompanied by fog and low clouds, the weather also restricted observation and movement of units and resupply by air. Rain made unimproved roads unusable by vehicle.

2 The 1st Bde also operated in the vicinity of Ban Me Thuot. Enemy activities in the area were confined to the harassment of convoys and standoff attacks against installations and firebases. No major attacks or contacts developed in the area. Enemy elements were primarily the 408th Sapper Bn north of BMT and the K394 Bn south of BMT. Identification of units was limited to the 312th LF Engr/Sapper Company and the 301st Local Force Battalion.

Weather and terrain were similar to the An Khe area. Observation and resupply were hampered by the rugged terrain and low visibility.

(b) 2d Bde area of Operations (4-42d Arty Ds)

1 Enemy Action An Lao Valley. Enemy activity during the first part of the reporting period was confined to small element actions. Rice, other foodstuffs, and salt gathering seemed to be the main objective of these units. Harvesting of the rice crop began at the first part of the period and with the harvest came increased contacts. No large elements were engaged until late November when LZ English received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. On 20 November, elements of the 2d Regiment, estimated to be a reinforced company, were engaged vicinity BS 822101. During the latter part of November and early December activity again decreased. In the latter part of December and early January, the enemy initiated contact both North and South of Hoai Mhon District. As yet there has been no large force contacts in the Bong Son area. However, with

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED,

CONFIDENTIAL

AVRDD-AC

31 January 1970

**SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2)(U)**

the alignment of forces on both the north and south comparing with the previous two years prior to TET, activity is expected in the near future. The apparent mission of the enemy forces in the An Lao Valley area was to disrupt the pacification efforts. Enemy elements identified in the area were possibly the 3d NVA Division to the west, the 18th NVA Regiment, 2d VC Main Force Regiment and the 22d NVA Regiment. Other smaller units are also suspected to be in the area. The weather in Binh Dinh Province during the months November, December and January has been characterized by periods of intense rain and cool temperatures. Rain has occurred for as much as four days at a time. It has been accompanied by heavy fog and low lying clouds. Nights have tended to be extremely cool and fog has also persisted in the mornings. Weather has not seemed to affect enemy movement to any great extent. Heavy foliage, due to the extreme moisture, has given excellent coverage for movement and concealment. Due to terrain and nonavailability of an adequate road network, resupply to forward elements was completely by air. Resupply was hampered by low-lying clouds around the surrounding mountains after being halted for three to four days at a time. The extreme wetness also caused health problems in that an increase in foot trouble and malaria was noted.

2 The 2d Bde shifted operations to the vicinity of An Khe during the last part of January.

(c) 3d Bde Area of Operations (2-9th Arty DS)

The initial portion of the reporting period was characterized by numerous standoff attacks against artillery firebases and one major sapper attack. Significant attacks by fire were made on LZ Delta, LZ Weight Davis, LZ Gypsy, and Plei Krong. The sapper attack occurred on 6 Nov 69 at LZ St. George and resulted in 41 members of the 408th Sapper Battalion being KIA. As the month of November closed, activity reduced, and the enemy avoided any major engagements. Occasionally small unit tactics were used to include hit and run ambushes, sniper fire, mines, booby traps and light standoff attacks. However, several Hoi Chanh and detainee reports indicated that the locating of caches by US forces resulted in a severe food shortage. A captured NVA noncommissioned officer led 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div elements to thirteen separate ammunition caches. The Brigade area of operation borders on the Cambodian border. Several large enemy elements operated throughout the Bde AO and adjacent areas. However, it appears as if the disruption of the pacification program and harassing attacks have been the primary goal during the last two months. Artillery pieces have been reported in the northern portion of the AO and 122mm rockets have been used against Pleiku. These rocket attacks have been credited to the 631 NVA Composite Bn. On 25 Jan a mine sweep team was ambushed vicinity YA9038 which resulted in two US slightly wounded and 14 NVA KIA and one captured. It is felt that enemy forces are replenishing supplies for a new offensive. Terrain in the area varies considerably. The Chu Pa mountain range is rugged and heavily forested, providing good concealment for the enemy. Flat grassy lands in the area around Pleiku and south of highway 19 prohibit movement

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

in the area. Weather had little adverse effect on friendly operations. Good visibility restricted enemy movement. Occasional gusty winds prevented or delayed resupply.

(d) Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) Camp Enari.

Division Artillery was responsible for an area approximately circular with a radius of 12 kms around Camp Enari. Enemy activity was mostly limited to small patrol contacts, light standoff attacks, and the harassment of convoys and friendly villages. The 4th Inf Base Camp, Camp Enari, was not fired upon or probed by enemy elements during the reporting period. This was attributed to aggressive patrolling and aerial observation.

(2) Survey

(a) Division Artillery survey provided assistance to organic battalions and provided directional control to twelve bases, as well as 4th order survey to Camp Radcliff and local firebases. A declination station was established at Camp Enari.

(b) Battalion Survey

Frequent movement of artillery firebases from hilltop to hilltop limited survey to directional control in the majority of cases.

(3) Radar

(a) AN/TPS-25 emplaced at Camp Enari was operational for 1161 hours of 1185 hours. The radar detected 41 targets which were engaged with artillery in support of the Base Camp.

(b) AN/MPQ/4A - Operational Status

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>HOSTILE POSITIONS LOCATED</u>
2-9	LZ Oasis	0 of 0
6-29	Camp Radcliff	3 of 5
4-42	Camp Enari	8 of 8

(c) Operations:

(1) The 1st Bde, 4th Infantry Division, supported by the 6th Bn, 29th Artillery, operated in the vicinity of An Khe with few significant contacts from 1 Nov 69 to 15 Nov 69. On that date sappers penetrated Camp Radcliff and

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

31 January 1970

AVDDD-AC

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2)(U)

destroyed 19 helicopters. One US was KIA and two were WIA.

(a) Operation Wayne Rock (Ban Me Thuot) 1 November thru 30 December.

In early November the enemy threat to friendly forces in the Bu Prang/Duc Lap area required additional forces. The 1st Bde was alerted for a possible move to Ban Me Thuot to relieve local ARVN elements destined for the Bu Prang/Duc Lap area. On 11 November headquarters elements of 1st Brigade and 6-29th Artillery moved to Ban Me Thuot, and a combination convoy/airlift moved 1-14th Inf and 2-35th Inf with DS Batteries (A/2-9 and B/2-9) to Ban Me Thuot East. A/2-9 Artillery and two tubes from B/2-9 Artillery moved into fire bases to the northeast and south of Ban Me Thuot. D/2-320 Artillery, DS to 3-506th Infantry, located east of Ban Me Thuot at FSB Chu Kuk (BQ226167), became OPCON 6-29th Artillery on 12 November. The operation began with elements of the 1-14th Infantry and 2-35th Infantry conducting search and clear operations and 3-506th Infantry continuing security of QL 21 east of Ban Me Thuot. Several small contacts were made in the 1-14th Infantry AO during November. However, in most cases the enemy chose to evade rather than fight. Intelligence indicated that elements of the 401st Sapper Bn were located in the vicinity of Hill 701 (AQ 9131) and the 1-14th Inf began a new operation in that area on 2 December. Two companies moved in from the SE and SW while the 3rd company moved into blocking positions from the north. Artillery fires were employed on hard targets and likely avenues of approach. CS munitions were fired into pre-selected areas with HE following approximately 5-15 minutes later. Three separate enemy contacts were made on 7 December, near the Mewal Plantation. A/2-9 Artillery supported the operation with blocking and interdiction fires. On 9 December 1969, emphasis was shifted to the 2-35th Inf AO with a three company search and destroy mission along the Dak Krong Ea River. The operation was directed against enemy elements thought to be in the area. Three tubes of B/2-9th Artillery were moved from BMT-E to LZ Blue (AP 783868) on 9 December to provide fire support. This area proved to be the most profitable of the Ban Me Thuot operations. Several small contacts netted 13 enemy KIA and 1 CIA. The enemy indicated numerous enemy KIA by artillery. On 16 December C Co, 2-35th Inf made a significant find which included 60mm and 82mm mortar rounds, B-40's, hand grenades, TNT, and 107mm rockets. Operation Wayne Rock was terminated and all maneuver and support elements moved into BMT-E 29 December and subsequently, by air and convoy to Camp Enari and Camp Radcliff on 30 December.

(b) Operation Wayne Thrust (4 January - 30 January): Operation Wayne Thrust was initiated on 4 January and directed at the destruction of the Gia Lai Regiment northwest of An Khe and the 18th Regiment west of LZ Hardtimes. By 3 Jan 70, four infantry battalions and one air cav squad (-) with supporting artillery under the control of the 1st Bde were staged at Camp Radcliff for insertion into their respective AO's on 4 Jan 70. An attack on the CIDG base at Hardtimes (Vanh Thanh) by an estimated two NVA/VC companies on 4 January caused an immediate readjustment of the operation. The 1-8th Infantry with C/6-29th Artillery and C/5-16th Artillery moved to Hardtimes to thwart the enemy threat. A/6-29th Artillery moved overland to FSB Emeia (BR 477595) to provide fire support for the 3-8 Infantry operations in that area on 8 and 9 January 1970. The 2-35th Infantry with B/2-9 Artillery airlifted to FSB Armageddon (BR 420645)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Divisior Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) 11

and the 1-14th Infantry with A/2-9th airlifted to LZ Toughie (BR553680) to conduct search/destroy operations in their respective AO's. Activity within the 1st BDE AO between 11 and 16 January remained relatively light. During this period, C/1-92 Artillery (4 tubes, 155mm towed) moved from CPR to FSB Emelia on 12 Jan 70 to provide medium Artillery support within the 1st Bde AO. On 16 Jan 70, intelligence indicated that Gia Lai forces were moving to the northwest, and the 18th and 2d NVA Regiments concentrated north of Hardtimes were moving to the east and west of the Song Kong River. AO's for the 1-14th Infantry, 3-8th Infantry and 1-8th Infantry were re-defined. Efforts to insert all maneuver forces on 16 January into the newly adjusted AO's were frustrated by the weather. However, as weather improved the elements of the 1-8th Infantry and 1-14th Infantry were displaced to the northeast. C/6-29th Artillery at LZ Hardtimes provided preparation fires for the 1-8th Infantry as did A/2-9th Artillery at LZ Toughie for the 1-14th Infantry. A/6-29th Artillery airlifted to FSB Challenge (BR628821) to better support the 3-3th Infantry and B/2-9th Artillery provided direct support to 2-35th Infantry from LZ Armageddon. C/1-92 Artillery moved by road from FSB Emelia back to Camp Radcliff for future deployment. At approximately 1130 hrs 19 Jan 70, C/2-35th Infantry and D/2-35th Infantry made contact with an unknown number of NVA in heavy bunkers (BR497705). A/2-9th Artillery and B/2-9th Artillery expended in support. On 21 Jan 70, C/1-92 Artillery and D/5-10th Artillery road marched to FSB Emelia to augment 1st Bde with medium and heavy Artillery. The operation of the 1st Bde began to shift to the northeast of An Khe and eventually will center in the "Crows Foot" area vicinity BR 800900.

(2) During the reporting period the 4th Bn, 42d Arty (DS 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div) supported the following operations: Operation Putnam Cougar, 22 Sep - 27 Oct 1969; Operation Putnam Wildcat, 2 Nov 69 - 18 Jan 70; Operation Putnam Power, 21 - 30 Jan 70.

(a) In November 1969 the 2d Bde assumed operational control of the An Lao Valley area and conducted operations in that area. There were few contacts made with platoon or larger sized units; however, the 1st Bn, 12th Inf and 1st Bn, 22d Inf were continually involved with contacts involving 2 - 3 individuals categorized as local VC and NVA. These small units were primarily concerned with transporting food from the coastal plain to the area west of the An Lao Valley. On several occasions, the 2d Bde was able to establish contact with company or reinforced company sized elements.

(b) Artillery support remained responsive to the ground commanders who were encouraged to use recon-by-fire techniques. The employment of one howitzer with each round being adjusted by the Forward Observer assisted in orienting the maneuver element in mountainous terrain as well as insuring rapid application of large volumes of fire when required.

(c) Because of the mountainous terrain on both sides of the An Lao Valley, direct communications to firing batteries could be established only through the use of a retransmission station. The secure voice capability was maintained by relaying between elements.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(d) Because of the fragmentation of enemy units into 2 - 3 man sized parties it was necessary to expand the area coverage of the maneuver companies and platoons. This necessitated the continued utilization of the "hipshoot" concept to permit complete coverage by the DS Artillery Battalion.

(e) During Operation Putnam Wildcat, the position occupied by C Btry, 4th En, 42d Arty was supplemented by the employment of two twin 40mm self propelled guns (M-42) and one 30 inch xenon search light. Because of the excellent fields of fire in the An Lao Valley, the "Dusters" significantly enhanced the ability of the firebase (LZ Beaver) to defend itself and minimized VC/NVA infiltration across the valley floor.

(f) The operation in the An Lao Valley terminated in the last part of January and the CP's of the 2d Bde and the 4-42 Arty moved to Camp Radcliff to conduct operations in that area. On 20 January 1970 C Btry was positioned at LZ Hardlines to support operations in Base Area 226 in the first offensive maneuver of Operation Putnam Power. The operation is continuing at the time of the submission of this report under the name of Putnam Shark.

(3) The 2d En, 9th Artillery (Direct Support to the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div) supported Operation Greens Ballet (20 Oct - 19 Nov 69), Task Force Plei Mrong (19 Nov - 3 Dec 69) and economy of force operations.

(a) Operation Greens Ballet (20 Oct - 19 Nov) was a search and clear operation in the Chu Pa Mountains. It was initiated as a joint US/ARVN operation but the ARVN forces - 2-42d ARVN Inf Bn and 3-42d ARVN Inf Bn - withdrew from the area of operations after two weeks in reaction to an enemy threat to the east. The 1-35th Infantry Battalion and the 3-12th Infantry Battalion were supported throughout the operation by their direct support Artillery, C/2-9th Artillery at Old Plei D'jereng and B/5-29th Artillery at LZ Delta (Punchbowl) respectively. B/5-16th Artillery (GSR) at Old Plei D'jereng, D/5-14th Artillery (GS) at Old Plei D'jereng, A/6-14 (GS) with weapons split between New and Old Plei D'jereng, B/1-92d Artillery (GS) at Bison II and A/4-42d Artillery (DS to 2-8th Infantry) at Plei Mrong, augmented the fires of both direct support batteries throughout the operation for two weeks (7-20 Oct) prior to the insertion of ground troops.

(b) Task Force Plei Mrong (19 Nov - 3 Dec) involved 2-8th Mech Inf, 1-35th Inf and 3-12th Inf. The 2-8th Mech Inf with its DS Artillery, A Battery, 4-42d, had been conducting search and clear operations directed by Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division on the Plei Mrong plateau. On 11 November the 3d Brigade operational area was extended to include the Plei Mrong plateau and the 2-8th Mech Inf was placed under OPCON of the Brigade. The 1-35th Infantry joined the 2-8th on 19 November and a TAC CP was formed at Plei Mrong to control the two battalions and artillery fires. On 23 November, the 3-12th Inf moved into the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDE-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

Plei Mrong area, releasing 2-8th which departed the AO under OPCON of the 4th Infantry Division. Direct support artillery accompanied supported infantry battalions. A Btry, 4-42d was at LZ Bernice supporting the 2-8th Mech Inf. The battery was replaced by C Btry, 2-9th to provide support to the 1-35th Inf after 2-8th departed the operational area. B Btry 6-29th occupied LZ Gloria Ann while supporting 3-12th Infantry. The 155mm howitzers of B Battery, 5-16th Artillery (GSR) and on 8-Inch of C Battery 6-14th Artillery (GS) augmented the fires of the direct support artillery.

(c) From late November to 24 January 1970 the number of infantry battalions under OPCON of the 3d Brigade was gradually reduced and the Brigade's operational area was enlarged, requiring the Brigade to assume an economy of force role to support the massing of five battalions of infantry and supporting artillery to the north of An Khe under 1st Brigade's OPCON. On 3 December 1-35th Infantry assumed a new area of operation to the west of the Division's TAOR boundary, immediately north of Thanh An. On 10 December, 3-8th Inf Bn was placed under OPCON of 3d Bde and assigned an AO directly south of Thanh An. The battalion's direct support artillery, A/6-29th, and the CP of the 3-8th Inf Bn established a firebase at LZ Puma. The 3-12th Inf Bn continued search and destroy operations at Plei Mrong. On 31 December the 3-8th Inf with A/6-29th Artillery departed the 3d Bde AO and both were returned to the control of their parent units. On 27 December the 3d Brigade's area of operation was extended to the westernmost boundary of the 4th Division. The 1-10th Cav, operating in the newly acquired area, was placed under OPCON of the Brigade and its DS artillery, A/5-16th, was placed under OPCON of 2d Bn 9th Artillery. On 4 January there were, operating in the Brigade's extended AO, only one infantry battalion, 3-12th Infantry and one cavalry squadron, 1-10th Cavalry, both with habitually associated artillery. Other artillery units in the Brigade's AO were: B/5-16th Arty(-) GSR, 2/9 and D/5-16th Arty(-) GS at LZ Oasis, A/1-92 Arty(-) GS at Plei Mrong and A/6-14th Arty(GSR & 175) GS at New Plei Djereng. In addition, two tubes of A/3-6th Arty occupied LZ Waigt Davis on 4 January 1970 in support of road building operations to the south. On 23 January 1970, two tubes of B/5-16th Arty moved from Camp Enari to LZ Fran to the east of Camp Enari near Plei De Lim. Purpose of the move was to support a company of 3-12th Inf operating to the east. The operation was terminated on 29 Jan and the hipshoot returned to Camp Enari.

(4) The defense of Camp Enari was the responsibility of Division Artillery. The area, generally circular in shape, included Camp Enari and the area within approximately 12kms of the base camp. To defend Camp Enari, three 105mm howitzers, four 155mm howitzers (SP) and mortars were placed under the control of 5-16th Arty and fired in support of the Camp and any friendly forces in range. Patrolling, aerial observation and search and cordon operations in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) discovered few significant enemy activities. An active night firing program was conducted throughout the reporting period, firing on suspected enemy locations, past and possible mortar/rocket positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(5) Artillery expenditures for the period are shown at Inclosure 3.

d Training

(1) General: Division Artillery continued with scheduled training as required by regulations. Emphasis on cross training of personnel continued in all Division Artillery units

(2) Division Artillery conducted replacement training for newly assigned Forward Observers, Aerial Observers, and Fire Direction Officers, and non-artillery forward observers.

(a) TYPE CLASS	DATES	NUMBER ATTENDING
Forward Observer	12-13 Nov	10
	26-27 Nov	7
Non-Artillery Forward Observer	1-2 Nov	6
Aerial Observer		2
Fire Direction Officer	19-23 Jan	5

(b) Six officers attended the IFV Artillery Fire Direction Course during the reporting period.

(3) Six classes were taught by 5-16th Artillery for the 4th Infantry Division and 52d Artillery Group in the use, firing, and maintenance of the 81mm and 4.2" mortars. A total of 204 students were trained.

(4) The mobile mortar training team also visited numerous units during the reporting period. Classes were given in FDC, crew drill on both 81mm and 4.2" mortars, and maintenance of section equipment. Proficiency drills were also conducted for FDC and mortar crews. Twelve battalion sized units were visited and approximately four hundred persons received instruction.

(5) FDC/ARTY Adjustment Training

(a) Artillery firings were conducted approximately twice each week for replacements and NCO Academy Training. These classes included instruction in:

- (a) Adjustment of fire
- (b) "Danger close"
- (c) Adjustment by sound

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(b) The 5-16th Arty FDC and 105mm Btry also supported a Div Arty FO School and one Div Arty LNO School with the same type of support as described above.

(c) In addition, the FDC and 105mm Btry supported a monthly artillery shoot for RF/PF soldiers. During these classes, an interpreter served as RTO in the FDC. This not only gave the RF/PF's training in artillery adjustment, but also gave the FDC excellent training in working with the Vietnamese troops.

(6) Battalion Training. The field artillery battalions in Division Artillery conducted unit and individual training whenever the tactical situation permitted. Training was conducted in all mandatory subjects with special emphasis on safety, communications security, M-16 care and maintenance and CBR. Units were also given training in enemy sapper attacks and the safe handling of US and enemy ammunitions.

(7) Batteries conducted the normal fire base/base camp training program. Special emphasis during the reporting period was placed on safety, to include weapons, aviation, and drivers' safety; the Chicu Hoi Program; and the dangers of narcotics. Maintenance was stressed during motor stables. This was reflected by the decrease in major deadline items during the reporting period. Battalions also received a class on GI Bill benefits. This class was presented at both forward firebases and at Camp Enari.

(8) Artillery Assistance Training. Division Artillery units continued with an aggressive assistance program throughout the reporting period. Battalions instructed supported infantry units in proper adjustment of fire techniques. Liaison Officers and Forward Observers also gave classes in the proper planning and utilization of artillery fire to supported maneuver units. Classes in artillery adjustment were also given to special forces personnel, American Advisers, ARVN and Regional Force/Popular Force units, MSF personnel and civil affairs personnel.

(9) Quotas for NCO Combat Leadership school (8), Mine Sweep School (9), and CER Refresher (11) were also received and used.

(10) At the beginning of the reporting period the 6th Bn, 29th Arty and 4th Bn, 42d Arty were equipped with the M101 Howitzer and the 2d Bn, 9th Arty with the M102 howitzer. M101 howitzers arrived for issue to the 6-29th Arty and 4-42d Arty. The howitzers were serviced by Ordnance and chronographed by Division Artillery personnel. One M102 howitzer was issued to each battery for training. When the unit commander felt all gun crews were proficient, a test team from 2-9th Arty was taken to the firebase and tested all crews. If the crews performed in a satisfactory manner, the M102 howitzers were issued to the battery at the firebase and the M101 howitzers were removed. This program worked out very well, and at no time was there a loss of efficiency or fire power as all gun crews were fully trained and operational.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDB-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(a) Logistics

(1) Basic Loads of Ammunition

(a) Current basic loads of ammunition.

<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>TYPE AMMUNITION</u>	<u>STOCKAGE AT POSITION PER TUBE</u>
105mm Howitzer	HE	200
	ILL	15
	WP	15
	SME	18
155mm Howitzer	HE	150
	ILL	20
	WP	15
	SME	15
8 inch Howitzer	HE	100
	SEL	20

(b) Variations of stockage at battery were authorized based on enemy contact and imminence of unit movement.

(2) Ammunition Supply Rate

(a) 105mm

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRED</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVINGS</u>
* 241801 Oct - 091800 Nov	---	---	---
091801 Nov - 241800 Nov	44.6	31.0	13.6
241801 Nov - 091800 Dec	42.3	39.7	2.6
091801 Dec - 241800 Dec	31.0	29.0	2.0
241801 Dec - 091800 Jan	29.4	23.3	6.1
091801 Jan - 241800 Jan	39.6	39.1	.5

* No restriction on 105mm He during the period 241801 Oct - 091800 Nov 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIATION

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
 Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(b) 155mm

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRED</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVINGS</u>
* 241801 Oct - 091800 Nov	---	---	---
* 091801 Nov - 241800 Nov	---	---	---
* 241801 Nov - 091800 Dec	---	---	---
* 091801 Dec - 241800 Dec	---	---	---
241801 Dec - 091800 Jan	21.6	19.5	2.1
091801 Jan - 241800 Jan	34.1	29.6	4.5

* No restriction on 155mm HE during the period 241801 Oct - 241800 Dec 1969.

(c) 8 Inch

<u>PERIOD</u>	<u>ASR</u>	<u>FIRED</u>	<u>TACTICAL SAVINGS</u>
* 241801 Oct - 091800 Nov	---	---	---
* 091801 Nov - 241800 Nov	---	---	---
* 241801 Nov - 091800 Dec	---	---	---
* 091801 Dec - 241800 Dec	---	---	---
241801 Dec - 091800 Jan	21.7	20.2	1.5
091801 Jan - 241800 Jan	31.2	26.8	4.4

* No restriction on 8 inch HE during the period 241801 Oct - 241800 Dec 1969.

(3) Equipment

(a) Deadline rates during the period 24 October 1969 - 24 January 1970

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AVAILABLE DAYS</u>	<u>DOWN DAYS</u>	<u>D/L RATE (%)</u>
Truck 1/4 ton	4773	302	6.3
Truck 3/4 ton	5804	460	7.9
Truck 2 1/2 ton	12827	1029	8.0
Truck 5 ton	1822	353	19.7
Truck 5 ton wrecker	243	33	13.5
Carrier M577	595	57	9.6
Carrier M548A1	892	153	17.2
Howitzer M101A1	2837	28	1.0
Howitzer M102	1944	28	1.4
Howitzer M109	1186	262	18.6
Howitzer M110	289	43	14.9

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (82) (U)

(b) **Combat Losses**

- 3 Antenna EC292
- 1 Radio set teletype AN/GRC-142
- 1 Truck, Cargo 3/4 ton
- 1 Truck, Cargo 2 1/2 ton
- 1 M102 Howitzer

(c) Two of the IS battalions exchanged their M101 howitzers for M102 howitzers.

(d) The ability of Direct Support Ordnance to provide float 105mm howitzers on an exchange basis has kept the D/L rate down.

f. Organization

(1) **Strength.** Authorized and assigned strength as of the end of the reporting period was as follows:

(a) AUTHORIZED:	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>ACG</u>
	HQB	38	11	164	213
	5/16	33	2	577	612
	6/29	44	3	479	526
	4/42	44	3	479	526
	2/9	44	3	479	526

(b) ASSIGNED	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>ACG</u>
	HQB	36	11	160	207
	5/16	33	2	530	565
	6/29	40	3	413	456
	4/42	37	3	420	460
	2/9	38	1	424	463

(2) **Replacements and Rotations:** Division Artillery received a total of 83 officers and 322 enlisted replacements. During the same period, 93 officers and 524 enlisted men rotated.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDFD-AC 31 January 1970
SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
 Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(3) Casualties:

UNIT	NOVEMBER			DECEMBER			JANUARY		
	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA	KIA	WIA	MIA
HQB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
5/16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
6-29	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	0
4/42	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
2/9	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0

(4) Morale and Personnel Services:

(a) Awards and Decorations. During the reporting period, the following awards were awarded:

1 Medal of Honor: None

2 Other Awards:

UNIT	DSC	SS	LM	DFC	SM	BSV	DSA	DSS	AMV	AM	ACMV	ACMS	ACMA	PH
HQB	0	0	1	0	0	1	12	23	0	2	0	30	32	0
5/16	0	0	0	0	0	6	15	11	0	8	20	135	33	0
6/29	0	0	0	1	2	29	16	11	0	5	50	71	51	13
4/42	0	0	0	1	0	11	4	18	0	3	3	107	8	14
2/9	0	1	0	1	5	13	0	16	0	7	122	130	0	0
TOTAL	0	1	1	3	7	60	47	79	0	25	195	473	124	27

(b) Promotions. Total promotions by grade during this reporting period are as follows:

UNIT	E4	E5	E6	E7	E8	E9
HQB	5	16	1	1	0	0
5/16	169	45	8	1	0	0
6/29	45	31	4	2	0	0
4/42	49	21	4	1	0	0
2/9	36	24	6	2	0	0
TOTAL	304	137	23	7	0	0

(c) Rest and Recuperation. During the reporting period Division Artillery received 655 R & R allocations and used 578.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVMID-4C

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operations Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

(d) Disciplinary Actions.

UNIT	No. cases of ANOL	No. ART. 15	No. CM
HQB	2	12	0
5/16	0	60	4
6/29	3	22	1
4/42	8	16	4
2/9	3	25	2
TOTAL	16	135	11

g.

(1) Aviation

(a) Aircraft Status

1 Disposition of aircraft during reporting period.

- a 1 Nov 69 - 12 Nov 69 - 9 aircraft authorized, 7 on hand.
- b 13 Nov 69 - 31 Jan 70 - 9 aircraft authorized, 3 on hand.

2 During November, aircraft 287 was received by the section. The possibility of being assigned the two authorized UH1H and one additional OH6A during the forthcoming reporting period would bring the unit to full TO&E strength.

(b) Personnel. The officer and enlisted personnel situation remained fairly stabilized during this reporting period. One officer rotated and one Cpt was gained. Three aviators are a 30 day loss and one is a 60 day loss. Numerous enlisted personnel losses were encountered due to rotation. All enlisted personnel have been replaced and an extensive training program is in progress. An operations clerk has been trained and a PLL clerk and avionics repairman are undergoing the program. All other personnel (officer and enlisted) have a minimum of 150 days in-country. Personnel status at the end of the reporting period:

Officer status

- 1 aviation officer authorized (Major) - 1 assigned (Captain)
- 6 commissioned officers authorized - 3 assigned
- 7 warrant officers authorized - 6 assigned

Enlisted status

- 20 E1 authorized - 17 assigned

(c) Operations

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

1 Due to the distance between base camp and the supported battalions in the field, excessive blade time was put on the aircraft during this reporting period. One aircraft and crewchief were based at LZ English in support of the 4-42d Artillery. Another aircraft and crewchief were based at An Khe in support of the 6-29th Artillery. This section achieved high aircraft availability rates during the first two months of this period due to the excellent maintenance facilities at organizational level and the support from the 704th Maintenance Battalion.

2 During January, two aircraft were deadlined awaiting parts (EDP) for main rotor heads. These aircraft received blade strikes at two locations because of flying debris. This caused an increase of blade time on the remaining aircraft.

3 Letters have been dispatched from this office to commanders of the units in the field requesting assistance in making their pads safer. Lesson plans concerning Aviation Safety were sent to all units in Division Artillery explaining the importance and need for a safe landing pad - one free of flying debris that could cause damage to a helicopter.

4 Much emphasis has been put on the safety program. This has resulted in a zero accident rate thus far in the fiscal year. Areas that have been strengthened include the safety SOP, scheduled safety meeting, poster, bulletin boards, required reading file, and a "Share It" program. With two instructor pilots, the aviators in this section have more than minimum training hours required.

(d) Summary

1 Aircraft utilization has continued to improve, with more efficient and better prior planning of missions by the supported units. Non-productive time has remained low. The 4th Div Regulations concerning load configurations aided the units in planning missions and resulted in better utilization of the OH6A.

	Nov	Dec	Jan
Hours Flown	512	517	560
Passengers Carried	2148	1867	1850
Cargo Carried	0	0	0
Sorties Flown	1264	1246	1367

2 The parts situation for the OH6A has been critical in a few instances. In these cases, the aircraft were down for a considerable length of time as mentioned above. Continued emphasis on the quality of maintenance and training of the personnel will result in higher availability rates. Continued education for the supported units as to the efficient utilization of aircraft,

CONFIDENTIAL

AVIED-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

safety procedures around aircraft and pads, and loading/unloading procedures of helicopters is planned.

	Nov	Dec	Jan
Percent availability	76	92	74
Percent MORS (MDF)	16	22	22
Percent MORS	8	6	4

(2) Chaplain

(a) For the quarter 1 November 1969 - 31 January 1970, the Div Arty Chaplain Section conducted the following activities. The section consists of two chaplains (one Protestant and one Catholic) and two assistants. The major accomplishments were as follows:

1 Conducted 88 Protestant Worship Services with a total attendance of 2163 (including Memorial Services).

2 Conducted 168 Catholic Masses and Services with a total attendance of 3850 (including Memorial Services).

3 Made a total of 38 visits to men in the hospital.

4 Made daily visits to troops located at base camp and an average of seven visits weekly to men in forward areas.

5 Attended three monthly training conferences and twelve Division Chaplain meetings.

6 Conducted 8 Character Guidance classes with a total attendance of 360.

(b) In addition to regular coverage of Div Arty units, the office provided coverage for the following units:

- 1 12th Signal Battalion (Companies A and C).
- 2 War Dog Detachment.
- 3 278th Signal Company.
- 4 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery (Dusters)
- 5 Company I, 75th Rangers.
- 6 CA Villages.
- 7 Dragon Mountain personnel.
- 8 Division units collocated with artillery units.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVR-41

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS IVA - 65 (R2) (U)

(c) The Div Arty Chapel was also used for special worship services, to include:

- 1 19 Jewish Services with a total of 146 in attendance.
- 2 12 Latter Day Saints Services with an attendance of 128.
- 3 12 Church of Christ Services with a total attendance of 67.

(3) Signal. During the reporting period, Division Artillery used the following means of communications: VHF and wire, secure and plain FM Radio, Radio Teletype, and messenger.

(a) Artillery communications:

1 VHF and Wire: Division Artillery operates no VHF systems, but uses VHF circuits provided by the Division Signal Battalion and the area system provided by the 43rd Signal Battalion. Primary VHF circuits include one to each forward direct support battalion, two to 52 GP Artillery, and one circuit to subordinate 52d GP Battalions when required. Local service is provided primarily by the base camp dial system. Wire hotlines are provided to the Fire Support Coordination Element, the Division Tactical switchboards, The 155 battalion headquarters, its operations center, and its FDC. Hotlines are provided to those locations required by IDCC for base camp defense coordination. (See para (1) below)

2 FM Radio: The following nets provide the majority of Div Arty FM communications during the reporting period: Div Arty Command Fire Alpha (Secure), Air-Ground, Survey, Sector Defense, and Base Camp Command (IDCC) net (Secure). A Command Fire Bravo frequency is also available when required.

3 Radio Teletype: Div Arty maintains a 24 hour RATT net with subordinate battalions using AN/GRC-142 radio system. This headquarters also operates a station in the Division Special Purpose net, providing an alternate RATT route to the artillery battalions co-located with the Brigades, who also operate stations in the Special Purpose Net. Mounted AN/GRC-142's are provided to the forward Div Arty CP (when activated), to Battalion TAC CP's (when activated), and to any artillery batteries operating beyond FM radio range.

4 MESSENGER: Messengers are used within base camp extensively, and the forward areas as required.

(b) Base Camp Defense Communications: As Division Artillery has the additional mission of coordinating base camp defense operations, additional wire and radio communications are required for this purpose.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVTDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

1 **Wire:** The control center for base camp defense operations, IDCC, has direct lines to CG, 4th Avn and 4th Med, the CG bunker, Dragon Mountain Switchboard, TFS-25 Radar, and a hot-loop to all sector control centers. Routine communications are provided by the dial system. Div Arty also installed and supervises maintenance of signal circuits from message devices installed around the base camp perimeter.

2 **FM radio:** FM provides communications to the sector control center, to patrols, villages, and aircraft in the base camp TACR. Secure voice is used continuously.

(4) Civil Affairs

(a) Division Artillery

1 During the reported period the Division Artillery S-5 had staff supervision of the Civic Affairs Teams of 5-16th Artillery; Headquarters Battery Division Artillery; 12th Signal Battalion; Headquarters Company, 4th Division; and 4th Military Police Company.

2 The village of Plei Pang (AR786229) was moved to the consolidated village of Plei Ho Hy (AR819243) to place the people under government control. In developing the local government, village and hamlet chiefs from both consolidated villages attended the government training center at Wang Tau.

3 IR5 rice was planted in both villages in an attempt to get the villagers to produce a second crop. The initial plots, if successful, will be harvested and used as a seed crop.

4 Continued emphasis has been placed on medical assistance projects to improve the health of the Montagnard people in the villages. Both villages have started a program to train Montagnard medics. Villagers from Plei Klan Ngol were sent into Province Hospital for three months of training as medics.

5 Major projects completed were the school with two classrooms and an administration office in Plei Klan Ngol, and the windmill at Plei Ho Hy.

(b) Psychological Operations. An audio visual team of the 8th PSYOPS Battalion visited Plei Ho Hy after the consolidation with Plei Pang. Information and movies were anti-VC and improvement of GVN image.

2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDDO-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Suppressive Fires for Evacuation of a Firebase or Landing Zone.

(a) OBSERVATION: Large slow flying aircraft frequently receive small arms fire when airlifting heavy equipment out of a landing zone.

(b) EVALUATION: When landing zones are being evacuated, the enemy will frequently use the noise and activity on the firebase to cover his movement to positions from which he can direct small arms fire at approaching and departing aircraft. On occasion, aircraft lifting heavy loads have received hits upon departure with the result that the load was jettisoned in order to take evasive action. This can often be precluded by firing suppressive artillery fires along the routes of approach and areas used by the aircraft just prior to entry and departure from the LZ.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That suppressive artillery fires be planned and utilized during the evacuation of a landing zone or firebase.

(2) Timeliness of fires on APD Sensings

(a) OBSERVATION: There has existed an unsatisfactory time lag between time of APD sensing and time of engagement with artillery fire.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to a lack of direct communications between APD aircraft and supporting artillery units, timely fire is not being delivered on APD sensings. Reports currently go to the Bde S-2, controlling the APD mission, and then are passed to the firing unit. This procedure results in excessive delays in engaging the targets with artillery fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That APD missions be coordinated closely with the Bde S-2 and a common frequency be designated and monitored by the sensing aircraft, artillery Bn Opns and Inf Bde S-2, enabling immediate reactions to positive readings.

d. Organization: None

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65 (R2) (U)

e. Trainings:

(1) Mobile Mortar Training Team

(a) OBSERVATION: With the need for a continuous training program for mortar sections in the 4th Infantry Division, it has become necessary to establish a mobile mortar training team.

(b) EVALUATION: It was found that, due to the high turn-over in personnel and enemy actions, all mortar sections were not performing in a satisfactory manner; therefore, a mobile training team was formed consisting of either an OIC or NCOIC and approximately three or four enlisted men. This team moved to the battalion's mortar position and actively conducted training in gunnery, FDC, and maintenance. Since the team was in a field location, they could supervise and evaluate the section's training by observing all field firing and night firing programs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That mobile mortar training teams be established to insure continued proficiency of mortar crews.

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications: None

h. Material: None

i. Other: None

5 Inclosures

1. Artillery Task Organization
- ~~2. Commanders & Principal Staff~~
3. Ammunition Expenditures
- ~~4. Chronological Summary~~
- ~~5. Map of Division HQ~~

Incl 2, 4 and 5 wd HQ, DA

Edward F. Gutzel, Jr.
EDWARD F. GUTZEL JR.,
Colonel, FA
Commanding

AVDDH-GC-MH (31 Jan 70) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of Division Artillery, 4th Infantry Division
for Period Ending 31 January 1970

DA, HEADQUARTERS 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION, APO SF 96262 14 February 1970

Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-HIST, APO 96307

(U) This headquarters has evaluated and concurs with the Division
Artillery Operational Report - Lessons Learned.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

JOSEPH E. McCARTHY
Colonel, GS
Chief of Staff


AVFA-GC-HIST (31 Jan 70) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery, Period Ending 31 January 1970, CS, CDR-05
(R2) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO S.F. 96350 28 MAR 1970

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHCC-DAT,
APO S.F. 96375

1. This headquarters has reviewed and evaluated subject Operational Report-Lessons Learned and concurs except as indicated below.
2. Reference the action North of Ban Me Thout, paragraph 1b(2). The sapper unit is probably the 401st Sapper Battalion which normally operates in this area. The 408th Sapper Battalion is located near Pleiku.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


JAMES H. MCKENZIE
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CP:
1 - CG, 4th INF DIV (LESS ORLL)
1 - CG, 4th INF DIV ARTY (LESS ORLL)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED;

AVHOC-DST (31 Jan 70) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 4th Infantry
Division Artillery Period Ending 31 Jan 1970 RCS CS FOR - 65
(R2)(U)

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558


1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1970 from Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division Artillery and concurs with the comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (C) Reference item concerning "Suppressive Fires for Evacuation of a Firebase or Landing Zone", page 20, paragraph 2c(1): concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

b. (C) Reference item concerning "Timeliness of Fire and AFD Sensings", page 20, paragraph 2c(2): concur. Item has been extracted for consideration for inclusion in the next issue of the USARV Combat Intelligence Lessons.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


L. D. MURRAY

CPT, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
I PFCRCYV
4th Inf Div Arty

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED;

GTOP-DT (31 Jan 70) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 4th Infantry Division Artillery for
Period Ending 31 January 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 21 APR 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. O'Connell
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

ARTILLERY TASK ORGANIZATION

1. (C) Artillery Task Organization as of 1 November 1969.

1st Bde

6-29 Arty DS 1st Bde (CP Camp Radcliff) BR465467
A/6-29 Arty DS 3-8 Inf, 3T Camp Radcliff (BR465467), 3T LZ Denise (BR520512).
C/6-29 DS 1-8 Inf, 3T LZ Denise (BR520512), 3T LZ Patricia (BR383425).

2d Bde

4-42 Arty DS 2d Bde (CP LZ English) BR877009.
B/4-42 Arty DS 1-12 Inf, 5T LZ Tape (BR745123).
C/4-42 Arty DS 1-22 Inf, 5T LZ Two Bits II (BR845948).

3d Bde

2-9 Arty DS 3d Bde (CP Camp Radcliff) BR465467.
A/2-9 Arty DS 1-14 Inf, 4T LZ St George (BR354144), 2T LZ Sylvia (AR805214).
B/2-9 Arty DS 2-35 Inf, 2T LZ Gypsy (YA060448), 3T FSB Oasis (Z4114275).
C/2-9 Arty DS 1-35 Inf, 6T Old Flei Djereng (YA867531).
B/6-29 Arty EC 3-12 Inf, 6T LZ Delta (YA935585).

Base Camp

HMB Div Arty
5-16 Arty (-)
EC 155 (2-155SP)
EC 105 (4-105T)
3-4.2" Mortars
3-81mm Mortars

Div Arty

5-16 Arty GS Div Arty
A/5-16 Arty, 2T GSR 2-9, LZ Rock Quarry (ZA055319), 4T DS 1-10 Cav, LZ Meredith (YA916277).
B/5-16 Arty, 5T GSR 2-9, Old Flei Djereng (YA867531).
C/5-16 Arty, 6T GSR 6-29, Camp Radcliff (BR465467).
D/5-16 Arty, 2T GSR 2-9, Old Flei Djereng (YA867531).
D/5-16 Arty, 2T GSR 6-29, LZ Schmeller (BR367458).
A/4-42 Arty, 6T DS 2-8, LZ Blackhawk (BR035535).

2. (C) Supporting Artillery.

42d Artz Cg

A/3-6 Arty, 6T Artillery Hill (Z4226533).
C/3-6 Arty, 5T LZ Ellodge (ZEL65065).
A/1-92 Arty, 4T Misc II (YA895357), 2T Old Flei Djereng (YA867531).
A/6-14 Arty, 2-8" Old Flei Djereng (YA867531).
A/6-14 Arty, 2-175 New Flei Djereng (YA855457).
C/6-14 Arty, 2-8", 2-175 (AR778899).
C/7-15 Arty, 1-8" Flei Mreng (Z4114676).
C/7-15 Arty, 1-8", 2-175 LZ Blackhawk (BR032523).
A/2-17 Arty, 4T LZ Action (BR264470), 2T Camp Radcliff (BR465467).
B/2-17 Arty, 6T LZ Schmeller (BR367458).

Incl 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

AVTDD-AC

31 January 1970

SUBJECT: Operation Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 January 1970

Ammunition Expenditures (1 Nov 1969 - 31 January 1970)

UNIT	TYPE	AMOUNT
A/6-29	105T	18,063
E/6-29	105T	18,671
C/6-29	105T	27,031
A/7-42	105T	30,287
E/4-42	105T	21,150
C/4-42	105T	19,840
A/2-9	105T	14,796
D/2-9	105T	17,839
C/2-9	105T	28,060
Provisional EC Battery	105T	10,075
A/3-6	105SP	9,709
B/3-6	105SP	5,707
C/3-6	105SP	9,342
A/2-17	105T	19,926
E/2-17	105T	21,399
A/2-13	105T	2,969
D/2-220	105T	9,309

TOTAL 105mm 280,873

A/5-16	155SP	8,219
B/5-16	155SP	15,240
C/5-16	155SP	20,045
Provisional EC Battery	155SP	5,751
A/1-92	155T	7,254
E/1-92	155T	5,936
C/1-92	155T	2,694
A/3-6	155SP	445

TOTAL 155mm 65,584

D/5-16	8"SP	7,484
A/6-14	8"SP	2,103
E/6-14	8"SP	1,814
C/6-14	8"SP	2,471
C/7-15	8"SP	3,199

TOTAL 8" 17,071

A/6-14	175SP	3,349
B/6-14	175SP	1,408
C/6-14	175SP	3,016
C/7-15	175SP	3,643

TOTAL 175mm 11,416

GRAND TOTAL 374,944

Incl 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

27

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing symbols must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)		2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310		CONFIDENTIAL	
3. REPORT TITLE		2b. GROUP	
Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 4th Infantry Division Artillery		4	
4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)			
Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 69 to 31 Jan 70.			
5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)			
CO, 4th Infantry Division Artillery			
6. REPORT DATE		7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO. OF REFS
31 January 1970		30	
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.		8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
a. PROJECT NO. N/A		701190	
c.		9a. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Assign other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.			
10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT			
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY	
N/A		OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED